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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the link between the measurement of intergenerational mobility and the
notion of equality of opportunity. We show how recently proposed theories of equality of
opportunity can be meaningfully adapted to the intergenerational context. This throws a new
light on the interpretation of existing mobility measures: these may be interesting to measure
mobility as movement, but they are inadequate to capture the notion of equality of opportunity.
We propose some new mobility measures, which start from the idea that the intergenerational
transition matrix gives useful information about the opportunity sets of the children of different
social classes. These measures are used in an empirical illustration to evaluate the degree of
inequality of opportunity in the US, Great Britain and Italy.
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1 Introduction
One of the most obvious applications of the idea of "equality of opportunity" is in an
intergenerational context. The feeling is widespread that income inequalities which arise from
differences at birth are a sign of unequal opportunity and should definitely be a cause of ethical
concern. There is less consensus about the desirability of further government policy to reduce
inequality in outcomes, due to other factors1. Such a concern for equality of opportunity is
apparently one of the main reasons to be interested in intergenerational mobility: our immediate
intuitions suggest that more intergenerational mobility means more equal opportunities. There
may be other reasons to be interested in mobility (see, e.g., Atkinson, 1981). Mobility may be
an objective in its own right. Or it may be instrumental in leading to greater efficiency. Or
(Atkinson’s own proposal) it may influence the overall level of social welfare, defined over the
distribution of income for different generations. But, although all these other reasons may play
a role, there will almost always be a link with concern for equality of opportunity among children
from different income classes.
Since intergenerational mobility is an old concern in both sociology and economics, various
statistical and normative measures have been proposed in the literature. Theaxiomatic properties
of these measures have been investigated by Shorrocks (1978, 1993). He shows that there are
fundamental incompatibilities between at first sight quite reasonable axioms. These axioms can
be related to the different reasons for being interested in intergenerational mobility mentioned
before.
1 Two recent revealing quotes -among many which could be given- are the following: "I am going to take the
position that if economic success is largely unpredictable on the basis of observed aspects of family background,
than we can reasonably claim that society provides equal opportunity. There might still be significant inequality
in income across individuals, due to differences in ability, hard work, luck, and so on, but I will call these unequal
outcomes. On the other hand, if economic success is highly predictable on the basis of family background, then I
think it is difficult to accept the claim that our society provides equal opportunity" (Stokey, 1996, 2). And: "If the
industrious and talented have much higher incomes than the work-shy and stupid, then not only might we not be
worried about inequality between them, but also such inequality as there is might be considered a positive good.
If, on the other hand, inequality arises from chance of birth -if one’s income is virtually determined by that of one’s
parents- then an unequal distribution might be a cause of serious concern" (Johnson and Reed, 1996). Both citations
are revealing in that they do not rank "ability" and "talent" among the factors to be compensated for. This is of
course debatable.
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With this paper we want to explore the link between the measurement of equality of opportunity
and intergenerational mobility. In section 2 we discuss how recently developed theories of
equality of opportunity (Bossert, 1995; Bossert et al., 1996; Fleurbaey, 1995a, 1995b; Roemer,
1993, 1996) can be interpreted in an intergenerational context and we point to some basic
normative choices which have to be made. Either one concentrates on the overall evaluation of
the opportunities of children from different descent or one tries to realise equal outcomes for
all children who exert the same effort. Both intuitions are basically incompatible. In section 3
we discuss the existing mobility measures based on transition matrices and we will point out
the relationship between different axioms and different motivations to be interested in mobility.
It will turn out that none of the existing measures captures adequately the basic intuitions of
equality of opportunity. In section 4 we show how the alternative measures proposed in section
2 can be interpreted and applied for the analysis of transition matrices. We also present an
empirical illustration. Section 5 concludes.
2 Equality of opportunities in an intergenerational context
It is common in the analysis of intergenerational mobility to concentrate on the two-period (or
two-generations) case and to represent the economic status of all individuals by a scalar measure,
i.e. to neglect all aspects of life-time mobility. The basic material for the empirical analysis
then consists of |N| parent-child pairs, with the respective income levels:
. Starting from the overall vector of incomes of two generations
, one then divides the income vectors for parents and children
in n equally-sized quantiles and one constructs the (nxn) bistochastic matrix P, where is the
proportion of children with a parent income in quantile i who themselves have an income in
quantile j (of the distribution of child incomes). This matrix P is called a quantile transition
(y˜ i1, y˜ i2) ∈ ℜ2 +, i = 1, …, | N |
y˜ = (y˜ 11, y˜ 12, …, y˜ i1, y˜ i2, …, y˜ | N |1 , y˜ | N |2 )
pij
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matrix2. We will return to the evaluation of such matrices in the next section. In this section
we will concentrate on the evaluation of the basic income vector from the point of view of
equality of opportunity.
The crucial feature of the various theories of "equal opportunities" is the way in which they
distinguish "opportunities" and "outcomes". Recent theories (the most prominent economic
examples being Roemer, 1996, Bossert, 1995, and Fleurbaey, 1995a, 1995b) draw a distinction
between two sets of variables: on the one hand variables for which the individual (in our context
the child) cannot be held responsible, on the other hand variables for which she is responsible.
The basic idea is to compensate for differences in outcomes resulting from the former variables,
but to leave intact outcome differences resulting from the latter variables. Roemer (1993, 1996)
describes a specific procedure to implement this distinction. He proposes to partition the
population in groups which are homogeneous w.r.t. the non-responsibility characteristics. All
individuals in the same group are said to be of the same "type". By definition, within each type
thedifferences inoutcomes can then beascribed to differences in factors for which the individuals
are responsible. Very often these responsibility variables are basically unobservable (e.g. effort
level). Roemer formulates a concrete proposal to overcome this difficulty. He assumes that
(within types) the individual outcome is a monotonically increasing function of an
(unobservable) "effort"-variable z. Two people of different types are said to have exercised the
same degree of responsibility if they are at the same percentile of the distribution of outcomes
for their type.
It is straightforward to translate these ideas to the intergenerational setting. We concentrate on
the situation of the children and we assume that their "type" is defined by the income of their
parent. If we suppose that there are n levels of parental income, we will have n different types.
Suppose that there are m children associated with each level of parental income, i.e. nm=|N|.
y˜
2 In theoretical work, and more specifically in the analysis of Markov-chains, the basic concept is an analogous
transition matrix but instead of quantiles one works with a (fixed) vector of n income levels (with
). An element in P then gives the probability that a parent with an income has a child with
an income .
[y 1, …, yn]
y 1 < y 2 < … < yn pij y i
y j
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In the terminology of the theories of equality of opportunity, we now have n types and m degrees
of responsibility. It is convenient for our purposes to summarize the information which this
structure yields by the (nxm)-matrix Y:
where the incomes in each row are ranked in increasing order3. We will interpret the differences
within each row as resulting from differences in effort. This implies that differences in outcomes
following from differences in natural abilities (not captured by the differences in parent’s
incomes) are treated here as within the children’s responsibility. As noted before, this is
extremely debatable from a broader philosophical point of view. Yet, although the
one-dimensional case can easily be generalised to a setting where the types are defined on the
basis of parent’s income plus other variables, this broader framework would require us to go
beyond the information which is traditionally summarized in transition matrices. The first
purpose of this paper is the evaluation of such matrices. Note indeed the close relationship
between Y and the transition matrices P: if we define n quantiles of children’s incomes, the latter
(nxn)-matrix can be immediately derived from the former (nxm)-matrix. This analogy will be
exploited later on.
For simplicity, we will assume that the ordering of matrices Y on the basis of the degree of
equality of opportunities can be represented by a function . It seems reasonable to impose
some monotonicity axiom on this function. We present it in a strong and a weak form:
Y =

y1(1)
.
.
.
yt(1)
.
.
.
yn (1)
…
.
.
.
…
.
.
.
…
y1(ρ)
.
.
.
yt(ρ)
.
.
.
yn (ρ)
…
.
.
.
…
.
.
.
…
y1(m)
.
.
.
yt(m)
.
.
.
yn (m)

S [Y]
3 It is easy to adapt the framework to the case of a different number of children in each row: we then simply follow
Roemers’s percentile approach.
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WRI (Weak Responsiveness)
Let and be such that . Then
.
SRI (Strong Responsiveness)
Let and be such that . Then
.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the equality of opportunity-concept. For each type t,
t=1,...,n, we can say that the corresponding row of the matrix Y, i.e. the vector
describes the opportunities of type t. For each degree of responsibility
, =1,...,m, we can consider the column . This vector describes the
outcomes for different types at the same level of responsibility. All this suggests that there are
two alternative ways to structure the evaluation function , summarized in the following two
axioms:
SER (Separability over Responsibility):
SET (Separability over Types):
These separability assumptions can be related to two basic intuitions concerning equality of
opportunity. The first is made explicit in the proposal of Roemer (1996). Look at all the elements
in one column of Y: these give the income levels reached by children of different types (different
parent’s incomes) but who exert the same effort level. From the point of view of equal
opportunities, it seems natural to prefer a situation in which those who exercised the same effort
level receive the same outcome and this completely independent of the income of their parents.
Given SER, this basic idea is translated in the following axiom which says that a more equal
distribution of outcomes for children at the same effort level is to be preferred4:
Y ˜Y y˜ i(j) = yi(j) ∀i(j) ≠ k(l) y˜ k(l) = yk(l) + ε (ε > 0)
S [ ˜Y] ≥ S [Y]
Y ˜Y y˜ i(j) = yi(j) ∀i(j) ≠ k(l) y˜ k(l) = yk(l) + ε (ε > 0)
S [ ˜Y] > S [Y]
yt(.) = [yt(1)…yt(ρ)…yt(m)]
ρ ρ y
.(ρ) = [y1(ρ)…yt(ρ)…yn (ρ)]
S [Y]
S [Y] = F[u1[y.(1)], u2[y.(2)], …, um[y.(m)]]
S [Y] = G[v1[y1(.)], v2[y2(.)], …, vn[yn (.)]]
4 We will formulate the basic insights of equality of opportunity in terms of strong axioms. The weak analogues
can immediately be formulated and lead to obvious changes in the following theorems.
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IAWR (Inequality Aversion within Degree of Responsibility)
Assume SER. Let and be such that
This axiom basically is a Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom, where the domain of is restricted by
the condition that the transfer should not change the rank order in the different rows.
There is a second intuition concerning equal opportunities, however. Take each row as a
description of the opportunity set of the corresponding type: the incomes which children of a
given parental income class can reach by varying their level of effort (for which they are
responsible). Assuming SET, these opportunities are evaluated by the functions . To
avoid unneccessary complications, we assume that these functions are measurable on an absolute
scale and hence are fully comparable over the different types. Moreover they are strictly
monotone and unbounded above and below. The idea that we prefer a more equal distribution
of opportunities can then be represented by the following axiom:
IABT (Inequality Aversion Between Types)
Assume SET. Let and be such that
Axiom IABT is again a kind of transfer principle, stating that a "redistribution of opportunities"
is positively valued. It entails a comparison between the rows of the matrix Y.
At first sight both these approaches are plausible and capture obvious intuitions. Yet it is easy
to see that they are incompatible. According to IAWR any redistribution of income from rich
to poor within a column must be positively evaluated, even if (when we consider the rows) the
Y ˜Y
ui[y˜ .(i)] = ui[y.(i)] ∀i ≠ ρ, y˜ j(ρ) = yj(ρ) ∀j ≠ k , l
y˜ k(ρ) = yk(ρ) + ε, y˜ l(ρ) = yl(ρ) − ε(ε > 0), y˜ k(ρ) ≤ y˜ l(ρ), y˜ k(ρ + 1) ≥ y˜ k(ρ), y˜ l(ρ) ≥ y˜ l(ρ − 1)
⇒ S [ ˜Y] > S [Y]
ε
v1, …, vn
Y ˜Y
vt[y˜ t(.)] = vt[yt(.)] ∀t ≠ k , l ,
vk[y˜ k(.)] = vk[yk(.)] + ε, vl[y˜ l(.)] = vl[yl(.)] − ε, ε > 0
vk[y˜ k(.)] ≤ vl[y˜ l(.)]
⇒ S [ ˜Y] > S [Y]
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redistribution goes from a low opportunities-type to a high opportunities-type. The basic
dilemma we face is illustrated in Figure 1, where the effort-level z is put on the horizontal axis
and the outcome on the vertical axis. Each graph represents the opportunities of a different type.
In the upper part of the figure children of type (social class) j will reach a higher income for all
effort levels but the lowest ones. According to IAWR a change in both the opportunities of the
types i and j in the direction of the dotted line will be an improvement: this goes strongly against
the intuition of IABT, because after that change the opportunities of children of type i are
(weakly) dominated by the opportunities of children of type j at all effort levels. On the other
hand, in the lower part of the figure the opportunities of type j-children are worse, except for
the very high effort levels and at these levels there is indeed a very unequal treatment of the
different types. According to IABT a further increase in this inequality (improving the
opportunities of type j-children) is positively evaluated. Of course, this is not so for IAWR.
Figure 1 about here
The consequences for the specification of are shown clearly in the following theorem,
which can be proven by application of standard results:
Theorem 1. (a) satisfies WRI, SET and IABT if and only if it can be written as
, where is non-decreasing in its arguments
and constant sum strictly quasi-concave, while is non-decreasing.
(b) satisfies WRI, SER and IAWR if and only if it can be written as
, where is non-decreasing in its arguments,
while is non-decreasing and constant sum strictly quasi-concave.
We are really at a crossroads here. Either we look at the different outcomes within one column,
or we concentrate on the evaluation of the different rows. As mentioned already, the first road
S [Y]
S [Y]
S [Y] = G[v1[y1(.)], v2[y2(.)], …, vn[yn (.)]] G[.]
vk[.]
S [Y]
S [Y] = F[u1[y.(1)], u2[y.(2)], …, um[y.(m)]] F[.]
uρ[y.(ρ)]
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has been taken by Roemer (1996). The second road was first described in Van de gaer (1993)
and further discussed in Bossert et al. (1996)5. In these specifications the separability axioms
SER and SET are replaced by the stronger additivity axioms ADBR and ADBT respectively:
ADBR (Additivity Between Degrees of Responsibility)
ADBT (Additivity Between Types)
Moreover, to arrive at his concrete formula, Roemer (1996) strengthens the axiom IAWR6:
EIAWR (Extreme Inequality Aversion Within Responsibility)
Assume SER. Then , where
is a non-decreasing function.
We can then formulate the following lemma, which is proven in appendix 3.
Lemma 1 (Roemer). satisfies WRI, ADBR and EIAWR if and only if it can be written
as , where and are non-decreasing.
To arrive at his concrete functional form, Van de gaer (1993) imposes next to ADBT an additional
additivity assumption within types. More interesting is the anonimity condition, to which we
will return later on:
S [Y] = Ω ∑ρ = 1
m
uρ[y.(ρ)]
S [Y] = Θ ∑t = 1
n
vt[yt(.)]
uρ[y.(ρ)] = min
t
wt(ρ)[yt(ρ)] ∀ρ wt(ρ)[.], t = 1, …, n , ρ = 1, …, m
S [Y]
S [Y] = Ω ∑ρ = 1
m
min
t
wt(ρ)[yt(ρ)] Ω[.] wt(ρ)[.]
5 Bossert et al. (1996) also give an axiomatisation of the concrete measures following from both approaches. Our
theorem 1 is formulated at a more abstract level.
6 The axiom EIAWR is not really a "strengthening" of IAWR in its strong version, since income transfers above
the minimum will have no effect on the value of .uρ[.]
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ADWT (Additivity Within Types)
Assume SET. Then
ANT (Anonymity w.r.t. types)
Let be a permutation of {1,...,n}. Let
Then
All these axioms lead to
Lemma 2 (Van de gaer). satisfies WRI, ANT, IABT, ADBT, ADWT if and only if it
can be written as , where are
non-decreasing, and is strictly concave.
The proof of lemma 2 can be found in Appendix 3.
Let us return to the interpretation of ANT. This axiom seems especially plausible in the
between-types approach and if we focus only on the information which is available in Y or in
the traditional transition matrices. Why would we treat children of different descent differently
if their opportunities are exactly the same? The social objective is to equalise the opportunities
vt[yt(.)] = ψt ∑ρ = 1
m
ηt(ρ)[yt(ρ)]
σn
Y =

y1(.)
.
yt(.)
.
yn (.)

, ˜Y =

yσn[1] (.)
.
yσn[t] (.)
.
yσn[n ] (.)

.
S [ ˜Y] = S [Y]
S [Y]
S [Y] = Θ ∑t = 1
n
ψ ∑ρ = 1
m
ηρ[yt(ρ)]
 Θ[.], ψ[.], ηρ[.], ρ = 1, …, m
ψ[.]
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of all children and not to discriminate against the children of richer parents7. But there is an
attractive interpretation in the within-column approach also: why would the evaluation of a
given income level be different for different types if they exert exactly the same effort? It is
therefore useful to note that Roemer’s evaluation function in lemma 1 satisfies ANT iff
.
For the analysis of transition matrices, we will strengthen axiom IABT. This axiom has been
formulated at the level of the evaluated opportunities for the different types. It states that a
"redistributionof opportunities" is positively valued by an ethical observer who wants to equalise
opportunities. This is not sufficient to capture the idea that a redistribution of income from the
better off types to the worse off types is necessarily positively valued: the valuation of such
redistribution will depend on the specific functional form chosen for the v-functions. The
stronger intuition about the desirability of redistribution of outcomes is formalised in the
following axiom IABTY. The formulation of this axiom is somewhat complicated by the fact
that we have to keep the incomes in each row ranked in increasing order: remember the definition
of Y. The child that receives the transfer is in the -th position before the transfer takes place,
and in the -th position after the transfer, . Similarly, the child that pays for the transfer
is in the -th position before the transfer takes place, and in the -th position after the transfer,
.
IABTY (Inequality Aversion Between Types’ Incomes)
Assume SET. Let and be such that
if , then
if , then
Then
wt(ρ)[.] = wρ[.] ∀t
α
β β ≥ α
γ δ
δ ≤ γ
Y ˜Y vt[y˜ t(.)] = vt[yt(.)] ∀t ≠ k , l ,
y˜ k(β) = yk(α) + ε and y˜ l(δ) = yl(γ) − ε
y˜ k(ρ) = yk(ρ), ∀ρ < α and ∀ρ > β; α < β y˜ k(ρ) = yk(ρ + 1), α ≤ ρ < β
y˜ l(ρ) = yl(ρ), ∀ρ < δ and ∀ρ > γ; δ < γ y˜ l(ρ) = yl(ρ − 1), δ < ρ ≤ γ
vk[y˜ k(.)] ≤ vl[y˜ l(.)]
S [ ˜Y] > S [Y]
7 However, the desirability of such a differential treatment lies at the heart of another approach to mobility: the
dynastic one, as defended by Atkinson (1981) and Dardanoni (1993). Here an income increase for a child is valued
less if her parent is richer. The motivation behind this approach is to maximise welfare over the generations and
surely not to equalise opportunities.
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The move from IABT to IABTY has important consequences. More specifically, if we impose
no further restriction on the valuation function and we want it to satisfy (weak) IABTY together
with SRI, then it has to take a particular form. We can indeed show that
Lemma 3. Assume SET. satisfies SRI, ANT and (weak) IABTY for all increasing
functions if and only if it canbewritten as , where
is the leximin ordering.
The proof of lemma 3 is in Appendix 3. The intuitive reason for the result is that, because of
SRI, the transfer described by IABTY increases and decreases but that the amounts
with which these valuations change can be arbitrarily big or small if no further restrictions are
imposed on the -function.
Things get even more complicated when we want to apply the IABTY-logic to a framework
with bistochastic matrices of transition. In that case, we will have to restrict further the kind of
transfers described in the IABTY-axiom, to make sure that the matrix resulting from the transfer
is still bistochastic. More precisely, we have to make sure that the child that "receives" the
transfer and the child that "pays" for the transfer simply swap income classes: after the transfer
the former must end in the income class in which the latter was before the transfer and vice
versa. Hence the transfer has to be equal to . As in the formulation of IABTY, we
consider again the situation where the child that receives the transfer is in the -th position
before the transfer takes place, and in the -th position after the transfer, . Similarly, the
child that pays for the transfer is in the -th position before the transfer takes place, and in the
-th position after the transfer, . We can then reformulate IABTY in the context of
bistochastic matrices as follows:
S [Y]
v[.] S [Y] = Λ[v[y1(.)], v[y2(.)], …, v[yn (.)]]
Λ[.]
v[yk(.)] v[yl(.)]
v[yt(.)]
yl(γ) − yk(α)
α
β β ≥ α
γ
δ δ ≤ γ
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IABTYBM (Inequality Aversion Between Types’ Incomes applied to Bistochastic
Matrices)
Assume SET. Let and be such that
if , then
if , then
Then
This axiom will play an important role in the following section, in which we turn to the evaluation
of transition matrices , where is the class of bistochastic transition matrices. The link
between the definitions of P and Y is obvious and has been explained before. The effects of the
transfer described in IABTYBM can then be interpreted in terms of a transformation of the
transition matrix. Assuming, without loss of generality, that the child with a parent from income
class k had an income in the j-th class, and that the income of the child with a parent from income
class l belonged itself to the h-th class, the transfer will transform the original matrix P into ,
where
3 Social mobility and the intergenerational transition matrix
In general, we define a mobility index as a function , where .
Many different mobility indices have been proposed in the sociological and economic literature.
Some of them are described in Appendix 1. In Table 1 we show their values for a sample of
published empirical transition matrices, which are described in more detail in Appendix 2. No
unambiguous ranking is possible on the basis of these measures. Except for one measure, B(US)
(for the US and taken from Behrman and Taubman, 1985) is the most mobile matrix. It can
also be defended that the transition matrix A(GB), calculated for Great Britain by Atkinson et
al. (1983) is probably the least mobile matrix. But it is not clear how the other matrices should
be ordered.
Y ˜Y vt[y˜ t(.)] = vt[yt(.)] ∀t ≠ k , l ,
y˜ k(β) = yl(γ) and y˜ l(δ) = yk(α)
y˜ k(ρ) = yk(ρ), ∀ρ < α and ∀ρ > β; α < β y˜ k(ρ) = yk(ρ + 1), α ≤ ρ < β
y˜ l(ρ) = yl(ρ), ∀ρ < δ and ∀ρ > γ; δ < γ y˜ l(ρ) = yl(ρ − 1), δ < ρ ≤ γ
vk[y˜ k(.)] ≤ vl[y˜ l(.)]
S [ ˜Y] > S [Y]
P ∈ Γ Γ
˜P
p˜ kj = pkj − (1/m);p˜ kh = pkh + (1/m);p˜ lj = plj + (1/m);p˜ lh = plh − (1/m)  and j < h .
M :Γ → ℜ:P → M[P] P = [pij] ∈ Γ
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Table 1 about here
If different measures give different rankings, it becomes important to understand better their
normative implications. Shorrocks (1978) proposed the following axioms which reasonable
mobility indices are supposed to meet8:
I (Immobility)
.
PM (Perfect Mobility)
SM (Shorrocks Monotonicity)
If and , then .
Since we will later concentrate on the evaluation of transformations of the matrix P, it is useful
to reformulate SM as:
If can be obtained from P through a finite sequence of MADT, then ,
where MADT is a "movement away from the diagonal transformation", defined as
The first axiom states that the completely immobile transition matrix is the unity matrix. This
axiom is widely accepted and identifies a lower bound for mobility. The next axiom provides
an upper bound. Mobility is maximal if children from all classes have an equal probability to
achieve each possible outcome. The third axiom captures the following intuition: if the elements
on the diagonal of are smaller than those on the diagonal of P, then there is more movement
between income classes in than in P, and therefore should be larger than . Clearly,
SM implies I.
∀P ∈ Γ:M[P] ≥ M[I]
Let PM = 1
n
ιι′. Then ∀P ∈ Γ ≠ PM: M[PM] > M[P]
p˜ ij ≥ pij∀i ≠ j ∃p˜ ij > pij M[ ˜P] > M[P]
˜P M[ ˜P] > M[P]
p˜ ij = pij + ε;p˜ ji = pji + ε;p˜ ii = pii − ε;p˜ jj = pjj − ε (ε > 0)
˜P
˜P M[ ˜P] M[P]
8 I is the identity matrix, is a vector with all elements equal to 1.ι
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All these axioms look very plausible. However, Shorrocks (1978) has drawn attention to the
basic conflict between SM and PM. For later reference we will summarize this result as
Shorrocks (1978) impossibility theorem. SM and PM are incompatible.
The basic conflict between these two axioms urges us to reflect more about the basic reasons
to be interested in intergenerational mobility and on the relationship between these basic reasons
and the exact formulation of the axioms. Shorrocks (1978, p. 1016) interprets his result as
reflecting a conflict between mobility as movement (captured by SM) and mobility as lack of
predictability (captured by PM). We see a more basic conflict between mobility as movement
and mobility as a means to equalize opportunities. The axiom SM fits perfectly into the former
interpretation, but PM does not. It is not straightforward at all that equal rows of the transition
matrixwould reflect maximalmovement. Compare PM andB in the following two-classexample:
It can be argued that there is much more movement with the matrix B. On the other hand, PM
is exactly in line with the equal opportunity ideas in the previous section in both interpretations
(as described in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2): PM is the best possible matrix because it incorporates
a completely equal distribution of opportunities. But what then about SM? What is wrong with
the basic intuition that more movement leads to more equal opportunities? To get a better insight
into this problem, we concentrate on the axioms ANT and IABTYBM.
Anonymity Between Types
ANT can easily be reformulated for the analysis of transition matrices:
ANT* (Anonymity Between Types)
Let be any matrix obtained from P by permuting rows of P. Then .
It is easy to show
PM = 
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
 B =

0
1
1
0

Ε[P] M[Ε[P]] = M[P]
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Theorem 2. SM and ANT* are incompatible.
Proof: Consider the mobility matrix
The value of the mobility index for can now be written as . By SM, M[2/3] > M[1/3].
By ANT*, M[2/3] = M[1/3].
The conflict between ANT* and mobility as movement (captured by SM) can further be
illustrated by the immediate result that ANT* and I imply PP (perfect predictability), formalised
as follows
PP (Perfect Predictability)
Let be any matrix obtained out of I by permuting rows. Then .
This implies that the matrix B, introduced before, has "minimal mobility", because the positions
of all children are perfectly predictable. On the other hand, we argued already that it can be
seen to represent maximal movement.
Inequality aversion between types
In the traditional literature on intergenerational mobility, much attention has been devoted to
cases where one row of P stochastically dominates another. We therefore define for any matrix
: . Row j of matrix P stochastically dominates row l
if with at least one inequality strict. In some cases the domain of
transition matrices has been restricted to , the set of so-called monotone matrices (see, e.g.,
Conlisk, 1989, 1990 and Dardanoni, 1993, 1995):
Pε =

1 − ε
ε
ε
1 − ε

Pε M[ε]
Ε[I] M[Ε[I]] = M[I]
Ct , r = ∑
i = 1
r
pt , i (t = 1, .., n ;r = 1, …, n )P ∈ Γ
Cj , r ≤ Cl , r ∀r = 1, …, n
∆
∆ = {P | Ci + 1, r ≤ Ci , r∀r = 1, …, n  and ∀i = 1, …, n − 1}
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A monotone matrix is a matrix where each row is stochastically dominated by the row below9.
The concentration on this form of stochastic dominance is an indication of the fact that the
literature on intergenerational mobility measurement focuseson the rows rather than the columns
of P and is therefore closer in spirit to the IABT-approach of Lemma 2 than to Roemer’s
IAWR-approach of Lemma 1. We will therefore also focus on the former. In this between-types
framework the stochastic dominance of row j over row l immediately implies that children with
a parent in class j have better opportunities than children with a parent in class l for all monotonic
v-functions.
The desirability of equalising opportunities between types has been represented in the previous
section by the axiom IABTYBM. Combining this axiom with the idea of stochastic dominance,
we can reformulate it easily in terms of transformations of the transition matrices:
DEOT (Desirability of Equalising Opportunity Transformations)
If can be obtained from P through a finite sequence of EOT, then , where
EOT is an "equalising opportunity transformation", defined as
(with at least one of the latter inequalities strict)
A comparison between the definition of MADT in the reformulated axiom SM and the definition
of EOT immediately shows
Theorem 3. SM and DEOT are incompatible.
The interpretation of the theorem is revealing. If we interpret social mobility as movement, any
movement between income classes will increase mobility and it is reasonable to impose SM.
˜P M[ ˜P] > M[P]
p˜ ij = pij − ε;p˜ ik = pik + ε;p˜ lj = plj + ε;p˜ lk = plk − ε ε > 0, j < k ,
˜Ci , r ≥ ˜Cl , r ∀r = 1, …, n
9 It has been argued that most empirical transition matrices are close to monotonicity. But the property is far from
universal. If we look at the matrices described in Appendix 2, three of them are not monotonous: those given by
Atkinson et al. (1983) for GB, by Rustichini et al. (1996) for Italy, and by Behrman and Taubman (1985) for the
USA. In this last case the violations of monotonicity are particularly severe. This is mainly due to the fact that it
is a large (decile) matrix: of course, distinguishing more groups will lead to more deviations from monotonicity.
If each individual would be put into a cell of his own, the matrix would only be monotonous if the intergenerational
process does not allow any reranking.
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However, if we are interested in social mobility as a means to equalize economic opportunities,
onlyan "equalising" movement (as definedby EOT) will increase our mobility measure. Another
way of interpreting the same finding is to note that MADT-transformations are a subclass of the
class of transformations defined in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and that therefore the
following axiom is a straightforward extension of SM:
PCP (Preference for Children of the Poor)
If can be obtained from P through a finite sequence of ABT, then , where
ABT is an "Atkinson-Bourguignon-transformation", defined as
Given the interpretation of the transformations it is obvious that PCP implies SM, but not vice
versa. The conflict between PCP and DEOT is obvious. Both transform the matrix P in the
same way, but they have a different condition on the rows where the transformation takes place.
By PCPall transfers of opportunities from childrenof richer to children of poorer parents increase
mobility. According to DEOT a transformation is desirable only if it is in favor of children with
worse opportunities. A transformation in favour of the children of poor parents at the expense
of children with rich parents will only equalise opportunities, if the latter group had better
opportunities before the transformation. This suggests that the conflict between PCP and DEOT
(andhence between SM and DEOT) will disappear if we restrict the domain of transition matrices
to : on that domain children of poorer parents will always have poorer opportunities.
On there is no longer a conflict between SM and DEOT because any MADT (and even any
ABT) will be equalising. Nor is there a conflict between ANT* and SM: in fact, the anonymity
axiom cannot be meaningfully applied on the domain since any permutation of the rows of
will yield a new mobility matrix outside . It then stands to reason that the
Shorrocks-conflict between SM and PM also will disappear for mobility matrices in :
Lemma 4. SM and PM are compatible on .
˜P M[ ˜P] > M[P]
p˜ ij = pij − ε;p˜ ik = pik + ε;p˜ lj = plj + ε;p˜ lk = plk − ε, ε > 0, j < k , i < l
∆
∆
∆
P ∈ ∆ ∆
∆
∆
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However, we do not feel that domain restrictions are an adequate answer to a conflict between
different attractive axioms10. It may be true that non-monotone matrices are rare, but typically
our sharpest intuitions involve the comparison of extreme cases. The exceptional character of
the cases is not in itself a reason to throw the intuitions overboard. On the contrary, they show
clearly the implications of the choice of a specific mobility measure. In this case there is a basic
conflict between two approaches to social mobility: on the one hand mobility as movement, on
the other hand mobility as more equal opportunities. In the former approach axiom SM is
perfectly meaningful but PM is not. In the latter approach, PM seems crucial, but SM does not
make too much sense. On the other hand, ANT* and DEOT (for the between-types approach)
seem indispensable for a measure of equality of opportunities.
Let us therefore now take a look at the different mobility indices proposed in the statistical and
sociological literature, some of which were already introduced in Table 1. Which mobility
measures satisfy which axioms?11 The details of definitions and derivations can be found in
Appendix 1. Table 2 gives an overview of the results. From this extensive, though not exhaustive
overview, we can conclude that all measures satisfy I, some satisfy SM, few satisfy PM and
ANT* and none satisfies DEOT. To measure "mobility as movement" there is some choice:
many measures satisfy SM. For those who want to analyse transition matrices from the point
of view of equal opportunities, however, the existing literature does not contain an attractive
index. The best choice seems to be and for obvious reasons: it depends directly upon the
deviation of P from . However does not satisfy DEOT.
Table 2 about here
This negative result is not really surprising since the literature has focused on mobility as
movement. At the same time, many people are interested in intergenerational links mainly
Mf[P]
PM Mf[P]
10 To resolve the conflict between PM and SM, Shorrocks (1978) also suggests to "exclude those matrices which,
by any stretch of the imagination, are unlikely to arise in practice". He therefore concentrates on matrices with a
quasi-maximal diagonal and shows that PM and SM are no longer incompatible for this class of matrices. P has
a quasi-maximal diagonal when there exist positive such that .
11 See Shorrocks (1993) for a similar exercise.
µ1, …, µn µi pii ≥ µj pij∀i , j
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because they would like to see more equal opportunities. This basic link between "concern for
equality of opportunities" and "intergenerational mobility" is not captured by any of the current
indices. Therefore, those who look at transition matrices from this point of view can be seriously
misguided if they use any of the existing indices. In the next section we will illustrate how the
insights from section 2 lead directly to some easy measures of "equality of opportunities" in the
context of transition matrices.
4 Evaluation of transition matrices in terms of equality of opportunities
Application of the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 to transition matrices will yield immediately an
operational criterion if we are willing to choose specific functional forms. We suggest some
specific choices in section 4.1. In section 4.2 we illustrate how our proposed indices work for
the evaluation of the empirical matrices from Table 1 and Appendix 2.
4.1 A concrete proposal
Let us first look at Roemer’s proposal in Lemma 1. We argued already that there are good
reasons to impose ANT in the within-column approach too, i.e. to impose .
We further assume that the evaluation function is not dependent on . This is less restrictive
than it may seem at first sight. Since we identify the level of effort on the basis of the income
level reached (the higher the income level, the larger the effort), the effect of differences in
effort is indistinguishable from the effect of income and can therefore be captured by the
specification of the valuation function. Bringing these assumptions together we write
where is increasing and concave. The well known iso-elastic specification is an obvious
choice for . If we work with a transition matrix the m effort-levels can be operationalised
as the percentiles of the income distributions of the different types. Denoting these percentiles
by z, we get
wt(ρ)[.] = wρ[.] ∀t
ρ
S [Y] = ∑
ρ = 1
m
min
t
η[yt(ρ)]
η[.]
η[.]
SR[Y] = ∑
z = 1
100
min
t
η[ytz]
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where stands for evaluation function according to Roemer (focusing on degree of
Responsibility).
The alternative proposal in Lemma 2 focuses on the evaluation of the rows. Again assuming
that the effect of effort differences is conflated with the effect of income differences, the
evaluation function from Lemma 2 reduces to
or, applied to transition matrices,
where stands for evaluation function focusing on the opportunities of different Types. The
income is the income of the j-th quantile in the income distribution of the children. Again
wecould use the iso-elastic form for the functions and . A special case withextreme inequality
aversion is
where is the leximin-ordering.
Figure 2 helps clarifying the interpretation of these valuation functions with a three-group
example. The upper part of the figure shows what can be called the opportunity set of a given
type i. Cumulative frequencies are put on the horizontal axis. They represent the effort level.
The vertical axis gives the evaluation of the incomes of the three quantiles: the specific numbers
will depend on the specification of . The shaded area gives the surface of the opportunity set
of type i. It is now clear how to interpret : it is the sum of concave transformations of these
surfaces. If we choose , the ranking of social states will be based only on the surface of the
smallest opportunity set. The alternative criterion does not consider the surfaces of the
SR
S [Y] = ∑
t = 1
n
ψ ∑ρ = 1
m
η[yt(ρ)]
ST[Y] = ∑
t = 1
n
ψ ∑j = 1
n
ptjη[yj]
ST
yj
ψ η
SLEX[Y] = Λ ∑j = 1
n
p1jη[yj], …, ∑j = 1
n
pnjη[yj]
Λ
η
ST
SLEX
SR
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opportunity sets of the different types, but instead takes the intersection of all the sets12. This
is illustrated in the lower part of Figure 2, where we have brought together two opportunity sets:
the heavy line is the intersection as measured by .
Figure 2 about here
It is important to realise that the measurement of opportunities requires more than just the
information in the transition matrix. Both for and for we also need information about the
income levels of the different quantiles. This is immediately obvious from Figure 2, but the
intuition can perhaps be strengthened by considering a specific example. Suppose we have to
compare two situations with the same transition matrix: assume it is the identity matrix in both
cases. Now suppose that in the first situation the income levels associated with the different
quantiles for the children are very wide apart, while in the second situation these income levels
are virtually the same. Then, although the transition matrices are identical, it is obvious that
opportunities are more unequally distributed in the first than in the second situation.
Figure 2 reveals another interesting insight: and coincide on the domain of monotone
transition matrices. Indeed, on , the smallest opportunity set is at the same time the intersection
of all the opportunity sets. We noted already that monotonicity is a far from universal
characteristic of transition matrices, however.
What we have proposed until now is the general specification of a social evaluation function
embodying among other things the monotonicity condition WRI (or SRI). Once we have chosen
specific functional forms for the functions in and , and for in , we can derive
from this social valuation function a measure of "inequality of opportunities" by the usual
procedure of defining an equally distributed equivalent measure of opportunities. In the next
section we will illustrate this for .
SR
SR ST
SLEX SR ∆
∆
η[.] ST SR ψ[.] ST
ST
12 The interpretation of in terms of the surface of the opportunity sets and of as the intersection of the
opportunity sets is due to Marc Fleurbaey.
ST SR
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4.2 An empirical example
To implement , we choose the iso-elastic specification for and for , resulting in
where
We write "average opportunities" as and using (1) we define the "equally distributed
equivalent" level of opportunities implicitly by
Bringing all these elements together, we compute an "index of inequality of opportunities" as
We can then rank different situations on the basis of
where we see the usual decomposition in a "level" component (average opportunities) and an
"inequality component".
While proportional changes in the income vector keep the within-row (ethically justified)
inequality constant, and proportional changes in opportunities keep constant, the effect of
proportional changes in incomes on is less transparent. To avoid complications with
different exchange rates or different price levels, we will consider in our empirical illustration
the degenerate case
ST η[.] ψ[.]
ST[Y] = ∑
t = 1
n Ot1 − α − 1
1 − α
α ≥ 0 (1)
Ot = ∑j = 1
n
ptj
yj1 − ε − 1
1 − ε
ε ≥ 0 (2)
O = 1
n
∑
t = 1
n
Ot
OE
∑
t = 1
n Ot1 − α − 1
1 − α
= ∑
t = 1
n (OE)1 − α − 1
1 − α
IOPP = 1 − O
E
O
OE = O(1 − IOPP) (3)
IOPP
IOPP
η[y] = y
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such that the opportunities of type i are given simply by the average income for the children of
that type. This makes invariant for proportional changes in all incomes. This also allows
us to normalise the opportunities so that the value for the children of the poorest type is equal
to 1. Following this procedure we get the values in Table 3 for the opportunities of the quartiles
in those transition matrices for which we could compute the marginal distributions (see
Appendix 2). Of course the methods used for the construction of these mobility matrices are
not always comparable and we have made some extremely strong assumptions to get at the
numbers in Table 3. The present analyis is only meant to be illustrative.
Table 3 about here
From Table 3 it is evident that opportunities are most equally distributed in Italy. This is
confirmed in the upper part of Figure 3, where we compare the values of for different values
of . Using equation (3) it can be calculated that for high values of , eliminating all inequality
of opportunity would be equivalent to an increase in average opportunities of 13.6% in the U.S.
( =0.12) and of 4.4% in Italy ( =0.042). Comparison is not always that straightforward,
as the comparison of D(GB) and Z(US) in the lower part of Figure 3 shows. For low values of
, opportunities in Britain are more unequally distributed than in the U.S. For high values, the
picture changes. This reflects of course the pattern in Table 3: as increases, the larger inequality
at the bottom end of the US distribution becomes more and more important for the value of the
inequality index. It is worthwhile comparing these results with the rankings obtained with the
traditional mobility indices (Table 1). It turns out that integrating information about the marginal
distributions in the evaluative exercise and specifying equality of opportunity in a consistent
way have important consequences for the results.
Figure 3 about here
IOPP
IOPP
α α
IOPP IOPP
α
α
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5 Conclusion
One of the main reasons to be interested in intergenerational mobility is the concern with equality
of opportunity for children of different descent. Researchers that are interested in an evaluation
of matrices of transition from this perspective have to be careful in at least two respects. First,
the mobility measures proposed in the literature are not attractive to measure equality of
opportunity. Axioms like Shorrocks’ monotonicity condition may capture in an adequate way
the idea of mobility as movement, but their relevance for the measurement of equality of
opportunity is restricted to the class of monotone transition matrices. Secondly, the transition
matrix in itself does not contain sufficient information to obtain a complete ranking of alternative
states of the world. Just like in the Atkinson (1981) framework, we also need information on
the marginal distribution of the incomes of both generations.
Recent developments in the theory of equal opportunities suggest two alternative approaches
to measure the degree of equality of opportunities captured in a transition matrix. One starts
from Roemer (1996)’s idea to aim for equal incomes for all children at the same effort level and
concentrates on the columns of the transition matrix. The other one elaborates Van de gaer
(1993)’s idea to measure the "opportunities" of children of different descent by using information
from the rows of that matrix. Both approaches are basically incompatible but both capture
important intuitions concerning equality of opportunity and can be easily operationalised. We
have illustrated this with some empirical examples.
Our approach underlines the need to think carefully about the normative implications of different
mobility measures. The theory of equal opportunities offers a promising starting point for the
development of new and interesting tools for policy analysis. More work is needed to get a
better insight into the empirical and theoretical implications of these new tools in an
intergenerational context.
-25-
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: The Axioms and Measures of Mobility
The axioms I, ANT*, PM and SM can be checked fairly easily.  We will do this in the
first part of this appendix, where the measures and their rationale are discussed.
DEOT is more difficult to verify.  For the measures for which it is not easy to establish
whether DEOT is satisfied, we will check DEOT in the second section with the help of
a numerical example.
1.1. Measures, I, ANT*, PM and SM
1.1.A. Statistical Measures of Mobility
(1) Measures of generational dependence.
Spectral decomposition of the matrix P yields P Ar r
r
n
=
=
å l
1
 where l r  is the r-th
eigenvalue of P and { }Ar is the corresponding spectral set.  A Ar s = 0  if r s¹ ,
A A Ar r r=  and A Ir
r
n
=
=
å
1
.  The T-th period transitionmatrix which, by definition,
contains the probability that a dynasty will be in state j after T periods, given that the
its founding father started in state i, is given by ( )P AT r
T
r
r
n
=
=
å l
1
.  The largest
eigenvalue of  P is equal to 1 because of the stochastic nature of  P so that
P Ar r
r
n
= ¢ +
=
åi p l
2
    and   ( )P i AT r
T
r
r
n
= +
=
åp l’
2
where p is the equilibrium probability vector: p=pP. Since the Markov chain is
assumed to be regular, p is unique.  If P I¹ , then the other eigenvalues will be smaller
than 1 in absolute value and therefore lim ’
t
TP
®¥
= ip .  They  will determine the speed at
which the transition matrix convergences to the perfectly mobile matrix, which is the
situation without generational dependence.  If P=I, all eigenvalues will be equal to 1
and we have complete generational dependence.
a) Asymptotically, the second largest eigenvalue determines this speed of convergence.
Hence its absolute value provides an indication of th extend to which the father’s class
determines the incomes of the future generations.  [ ] [ ]M P Pl l= -1 2   can thus be
used as a measure of mobility.
The product of the eigenvalues of P i equal to the determinant of   P.  Inter changing
rows of  P does not change the absolute value of the determinant and hence the
absolute value of the product of the eigenvalues.  It does, however, change the trace of
the matrix which is equal to the sum of the eigenvalues.  The eigenvalues change and
[ ]M Pl  will not satisfy ANT
*. Under PM, P = ip ’ , and from the introductory
                                                                A-2
discussion to this section it follows that l i = 0  " ³i 2 .  Hence PM is always met.
Since l i = 1  "i  if and only if P=I, I is always met.
Shorrocks (1978) proposed to use [ ]M P eh h= -  where [ ]( ) ( )h Log Log= - 2 2l
which can be interpreted as the asymptotic half life of the chain.  Since h depends on
l 2 , this measure inherits all the properties of [ ]M Pl e .
b) The arithmetic mean of the eigenvalues, ( )( )1 1
2
n r
r
n
-
=
å l , can be used as the basis
for a measure of immobility.  Since the sum of the eigenvalues of P is eq al t  the trace
of P, [ ] [ ]( ) ( )M P n Tr P nt = - -1 can be used as a measure of mobility. The
transformations of the probabilities that are allowed by SM increase the trace of a
matrix, and therefore [ ]M Pt  satisfies SM.  Consequently the measure violates PM and
ANT*.  I is satisfied.
These conclusions are valid for many sociological mobility indices (see Boudon (1973)
for their definition).  For the class of mobility matrices considered in this paper, [ ]M Pt
is equal to the generalized Yasuda mobility index and a variation of the Matras index.
The measure is also proportional to the generalized Boudon index.  Hence all these
measures have the same properties.  There also exist measures which depend only on
the diagonal elements of P.  This is the case for any judgment based upon the n values
of the Glass index or their inverses, the n valu s of the Prais index.  Also these
measures1 exhibit the same axiomatic properties as [ ]M Pt .
c) The absolute value of the geometric mean of the eigenvalues, l l l2 3
1 1
... n
n-
 , is
another possible immobility measure.  Since the product of all the eigenvalues equals
the determinant of the matrix, we have that [ ]M P Pd
n= - -1 1 1 .
Changing rows in a matrix does not change the absolute value of its determinant.
Therefore this measure satisfies ANT* always and cannot satisfy SM.  P M = 0  so that
P M   corresponds maximal mobility.  However, as soon as any two rows of the matrix
P are equal, P = 0 such that PM is not satisfied.  The absolute value of the product of
the eigenvalues is maximal if all l i  are equal to 1.  Hence I is met.
d) It is also possible to define measures which directly depend upon the deviation of P
from i p ' .  One such measure is [ ] ( )M P n pf ij j
ji
n
j
n
= -
-
==
åå1 1 2
11
p
p
.
The measure always satisfies PM, and, because switching rows in the matrix P only
provokes the same permutation in p , ( )p p= P , [ ]M Pf  always satisfies ANT* and
cannot satisfy SM.  I is satisfied.
                                         
1 The dependence of many sociological measures upon the diagonal elements of the matrix of
transition only is probably due to the difficulty in ordering sociological classes such as, e.g.,
occupations.
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(2) Measures of Movement
a) The expected proportion of family lines changing class from one generation to the
next in steady state is given by [ ]M P p pl i ij
j
j i
n
i
n
i ii
i
n
= = -
=
¹
= =
åå åp p
11 1
1 .  Again, Shorrocks
type transformations of P increase the diagonal elements of P, so that the measure
satisfies SM, and, as a consequence, this measure cannot satisfy PM nor ANT*. I is
evidently met.  Note also that all transitions are treated alike, irrespective of the width
of the transition (assuming states can be ordered).  This was Bartholomew’s (1982)
motivation for the next measure
b) When we weight each class transition by the number of class boundaries which have
been crossed, we get Bartholomew’s measure of mobility
[ ] ( )( )M P n p i jB i ij
j
n
i
n
= - -
==
åå1 1
11
p . Again, this measure satisfies SM and does not
satisfy PM nor ANT*.  I is satisfied.
c) Conlisk (1990) has proposed two measures of mobility.  The first one, Conlisk ‘s D-
criterion, defines an incomplete ordering of monotone matrices of transition and is
based on the degree of monotonicity of the matrices to be compared.  Indeed, P*  is
considered to be more mobile than P if [ ] [ ]D P D P* <  where [ ]D P  has as i,n-l th
element Ci n l, - .   [ ]D P*  is similarly defined.     Both are square matrices of dimension
n-1, the inequality sign has to hold for all corresponding elements of the matrices.
There does not exist any matrix P such that [ ] [ ]D I D P< , nor does there exists any
monotone matrix P¹ PM such that [ ] [ ]D P D P M< .   In that sense I and PM are satisfied.
Changing rows in a transition matrix affects [ ]D P  and the criterion does not meet
ANT*.  The transformations permitted by SM affect different rows of [ ]D P  differently,
so SM does not hold true.
Let N be the matrix containing nij , the expected number of periods that it takes the
chain to get from state i to state j, as elements.  Then p p' N  has been suggested as an
immobility measure (Conlisk, 1990).  Let then [ ]M P Nm = 1 p p'  be a measure of
mobility.  We have that [ ] ( )( )M Pm e e= +1 1 1 2 , showing that the measure is
increasing in e, and as a consequence cannot satisfy PM nor ANT*.  I is satisfied.
Note that this measure satisfies the D-criterion mentioned above and so does not
generally satisfy SM.
1.1.B. Measures based on the equalization of dynastic incomes
Originally, these measures were formulated to judge transition matrices on the basis of
the extent to which income mobility led to an increased equality of total revenues over
a longer time span for an individual.  In principle these measures can also be applied to
dynasties, however.  When P I= , no equalization takes place, and, as a consequence,
there will be no mobility.  Therefore these criteria satisfy I.
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Conlisk (1989) proposes to rank the matrices of transition on the basis of the
equalization of the present value of expected incomes that result from repeated
application of this matrix. To see that PP (and hence ANT*) or PM are satisfied,
consider the following example.  Let y y y yi1 = = = =... ... t .  Then the present value
of a dynasty ‘s income over t g nerations becomes [ ]Y P y Py P y= + + +r r t t... .  Since
the properties have to hold for all possible y vectors and for all possible values of t and
r, let r = 1, t = 2 and y c y ii n i= - "- .  Then [ ]Y P  will be completely equalized for
the matrix P A which has zeros everywhere except on the non-main diagonal where it
has ones.  This contradicts PM and PP since the ‘best’ matrix is given by P A . P A  is a
permutation of I and therefore ANT*  is not satisfied by Conlisk’s criterion.  The
criterion does not satisfy SM in general either.  For, take the same example as above
with t = 1 .  If [ ] [ ]$ < >i j Y P Y Pi j: , SM is not met.  In that case, a transformation Tij
makes a relatively bad outcome more likely for dynasty i in the next period.  This
lowers [ ]Y Pi .  At the same time a good outcome becomes more likely for dynasty j,
increasing [ ]Y Pj .  Therefore the transformation has led to a transfer which equalized
the present value of the expected lifetime incomes, and, consequently increased
mobility, which contradicts SM.
The criterion proposed by Chakravarty et al. (1985) is similar in spirit to Conlisk’s
criterion.  They propose to rank social states on the basis of the decrease in inequality
measures, caused by mobility.  These measures have the same properties as Conlisk’s:
they do not satisfy PM, ANT* nor SM.2
1.1.C. Measures that require information on the marginal distributions
(1) Measures based on regression analysis
These measures have been very popular in econometric research.  They start from a
very traditional economic specification: [ ] [ ]ln lny yti t t ti i+ = + +1 a b e  .  The estimate of
the coefficient b , $b  is then interpreted as a coefficient of immobility.  Hence,
M $ $b b= -1  is a measure of mobility.  Since 
[ ] [ ]{ }
( ){ }
$
ln ,ln
b =
+Cov y y
Var y
t t
t
1
2
, it is easy to
establish that this measure satisfies SM.  SM type of transformations decrease the
covariance term, thereby decreasing $b  a d increasing mobility.  As a result, the
measure satisfies I, but cannot satisfy ANT*, PM, nor DEOT.
The Hart measure of mobility, extensively discussed in Shorrocks (1993), is defined as
[ ] [ ][ ]M r y yH t t= - +1 1ln ,ln , where [ ] [ ][ ]r y yt tln ,ln +1  is the correlation coefficient
between incomes of different generations.  Provided that the covariance between
                                         
2 To verify this claim, consider social welfare functions which are additively separable over
individuals.  Reformulate the problem in terms of matrices of transition and reconstruct the counter-
example given above for Conlisk.
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[ ]ln yti  and e i   is zero, we have that 
[ ][ ]
[ ][ ]M
s y
s y
H
t
t
= -
+
1
1
$ ln
ln
b  where [ ]s ×  is the sample
standard deviation.  For given marginal distributions, M H  varies inversely with 
$b .
Hence, it satisfies SM and therefore I, but cannot satisfy PM, ANT* nor DEOT.
(2) Measures of Distributional Change
These measures, which we have labeled M DC , have been proposed to evaluate
changes of frequency distributions and are therefore suited to analyze the problem of
intergenerational mobility.  Their properties come out most clearly in the axiomatic
treatment by Cowell (1985).  They satisfy SM and hence I, but not PM, ANT* nor
DEOT.
1.2. Measures and DEOT
Consider the following transition matrix:
[ ]A a
a a
a a=
+ -
- +
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
0 5 0 25 0 25
0 25 0 5 0 25
0 25 0 25 0 5
. . .
. . .
. . .
  where -0.25<a<0.25
This matrix is clearly monotonous.  Clearly Conlisk’s D-criterion cannot generally
satisfy DEOT because increasing a increases monotonicity between the first and
second row, but decreases monotonicity between the second and third row.  For the
other measures, DEOT requires that, for a1 0> , [ ][ ] [ ][ ]M A M A a0 1> .  However, the
measures of mobility provide the following values for mobility:
measure [ ][ ]M A 0 [ ][ ]M A 0 1.
[ ] [ ]M P Pl l= -1 2 , [ ]M P eh h= - 0.25 0.25
[ ] [ ]( ) ( )M P n Tr P nt = - -/ 1 0.75 0.8
[ ] ( )M P Pd
n= - -1 1 1 0.75 0.806
[ ] ( )M P n
p
f
ij j
ji
n
j
n
= -
-
==
åå1 1 2
11
p
p
0.667 0.711
[ ] ( )M P pl ii
i
= -
=
å1 13
1
3 0.5 0.533
[ ] ( )M P n p n i jB
ij
j
n
i
n
= - æèç
ö
ø÷ -
==
åå1
11
1/3 1/3
[ ]M Pm 0.272 0.285
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Appendix 2: Empirical Implementation
The following table provides a short description of the mobility matrices used in the
construction of table 1 in section 3 and the empirical example of section 4.
Source
Country
name
data
set
year
(F/S)
N. of
Obs
N. Of
Class
income
variable
info on
marg.
distrib.
Atkinson
(1983)
GB
Rowntree
follow-up
I: 1950
I:1975-8
374 5 age-
adjusted
hourly
earnings
Some
Behrman and
Taubman
(1985)
US
NAS-NRS
Twin sample
B:1917-
27
I:1977-81
1025 10 experience
adjusted
yearly
earnings
None
Zimmerman
(1992)
US
NLS
panel
I:1965
I:1981
278 4 log yearly
earnings
None
Rustichini,
Ichino and
Checci (1996)
US/It
It:INMS
US: PSID
I:1985
I:1974
I:1990
1681
1050
4
4
median
occupatio-
nal income
median
occupatio-
nal income
Some
Some
Dearden,
Machin and
Reed (1997)
GB
NCDS
panel
I:1974
B:1958/I:
1991
1565 4 predicted
permanente
arnings
None
I: the year the interview was taken
B: the year of birth
Few studies report information on the marginal distributions of fathers’ or sons’
incomes.  A notable exception is Rustichini et al (1996).  We used his data to fit a
lognormal distribution of incomes.  Due to the fact that his data are based on median
occupational incomes, we get an underestimation of inequality.  Atkinson (1983) also
provides some information on the distribution of hourly earnings in Great Britain. We
used his data to fit a lognormal distribution of  hourly earnings for Great Britain.
Rustichini et al. (1996)’s article contains 8 points of the distribution of their index
(octiles) of occupational incomes.  These incomes were normalised such that the
minimal value of occupational income equals 100.  The estimation procedure fits a
cumulative lognormal distribution with origin equal to 100 to these eight data points.
The parameter values of the lognormal distribution are those which minimize the sum
of squared residuals.  In the present context, this is not a maximum likelihood
procedure, but a distance minimization procedure.  The same procedure was applied to
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the 4 data points mentioned in Atkinson (1983).  With some imagination the origin of
the lognormal distribution was put equal to 1.0.  This yielded the following results:
R (US): LN{4.687, 0.735}, origin 100
R (It): LN{3.321,0.724}, origin 100
A (GB): LN{-0.472,0.890}, origin 1.00
The estimated lognormal distributions were used to calculate the mean income per
quartile of the childrens’ income distribution.  We obtained the following values:
bottom 25-50 50-75 Top
R (It) 111.7 122.1 135.4 174.8
R (US) 145.2 186.4 239.2 397.9
A (GB) 1.218 1.474 1.845 3.170
Appendix 3: Proofs of Lemmas 1, 2 and  3.
Lemma 1
The proof follows directly from combining the different axioms in the following way:
WRI+SER [ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]Û =S Y F u y u y u ym m1 1 2 2. . ., , ,K
 with [ ]S  and [ ]F  non decreasing
EIAWR ( )[ ] ( )[ ]Û =u y u yt t tr r r r. min
ADBR [ ] ( )[ ]Û = é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
=
åS Y u y
m
W r r
r
.
1
Lemma 2
The proof again follows directly upon combining the different axioms:
(a) WRI+SET+IABT [ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]Û =S Y G v y v yn n1 1 . ., ,K
with [ ]G  and [ ]vt  non decreasing and [ ]vt  constant sum strictly quasi-
concave  (theorem 1, a)
(b) ANT ( )[ ]Û v yt t .  does not depend upon t: ( )[ ] ( )[ ]v y v yt t t. .=
AND [ ]G .,., ,.K  is symmetric
(c) ADWT ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]Û = é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
=
åv y yt t t t t
m
. Y h r r
r 1
(d) ADBT [ ] ( )[ ]Û = é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
=
åS Y v yt t
t
n
Q .
1
The lemma follows by introducing  (c) and (d) in (a) and by taking into account that,
because of ANT, the subscript t of the v- function has to be dropped, which means that
the subscript t in the h  -function has to be dropped.
                                                                A-8
Lemma 3
IABTY compares income vectors which are such that
( )[ ] ( )[ ]v y v yt t t t~ . .=   " ¹t k l,
AND ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]v y v y v y v yk k k k l l l l. . . .~ ~< £ < , where the strict inequalities
follow from SRI.
Then, IABTY says that these vectors are to be preferred.
This implies that we also prefer vectors which are such that
( )[ ] ( )[ ]v y v yt t t t~ . .=   " ¹t k l,  AND ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]v y v y v y v yk k k k l l l l. . . .~ ~< < <
To prove Lemma 3, we now apply Sen’s Leximin Derivation Theorem (Sen, 1986,
p.1119).  This theorem is applied in three steps:
(a) SRI+IABTYÞ HE
Following Sen (1986, p.1116) HE, Hammond's Equity can be formally defined
as follows:
Let X be the set of alternative social states and H the set of individuals.
For any x y X, Î , if some pair g h H, Î , [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]U y U x U x U yg g h h> > >  and
[ ] [ ]" ¹ =i g h U x U yi i, , , then xRy
(note: we have 'implied' but not 'equivalent to' because of the strong inequality
sign in the middle, and xRy in stead of xPy.)
(b) We also have that SRI Û  P (Strong Pareto)
Following Sen (1986, p.1115, fn 61), P can be defined as:
[ ]" Î " $ Þx y X i xR y i xP y xPyi i, , : & :  and [ ]" Þi xI y xIyi:
(note: it is here that SRI is needed in stead of WRI)
(c) In addition, ANTÛ A (Anonimity)
Following Sen (1986, p.1116), A can be defined as:
If { }U i is a re-ordering (permutation) of { }U i* , then { }[ ] { }[ ]F U F Ui i= *
Therefore, SET+SRI+IABTY+ANTÞ HE+P+A.  The proof is completed by noting
that Sen’s Leximin Derivation Theorem establishes the equivalence between HE+P+A
and Leximin.
Table 1. Social mobility in some published transition matrices
A (GB) 0.608 0.826 0.865 0.522 0.661 0.282 0.883
D (GB) 0.606 0.862 0.950 0.707 0.646 0.317 0.859
B (US) 0.850 0.970 0.943 0.721 0.873 0.331 0.971
Z (US) 0.665 0.870 0.947 0.710 0.652 0.314 0.856
R (US) 0.670 0.881 0.943 0.710 0.661 0.319 0.887
R (It) 0.660 0.920 0.918 0.684 0.690 0.328 0.904
See appendix 1 for the definition of the mobility indices and appendix 2 for information
concerning the transition matrices.
Mλ Mt Md Mf Ml MB Mm
B-1
Table 2. Axiomatic analysis of mobility measures
measure I SM PM ANT* DEOT
y n y n n
y y n n n
y n n y n
y n y y n
y y n n n
y y n n n
y n n n n
Conlisk’s D y n y n n
Chakravarty y n n n n
y y n n n
y y n n n
y y n n n
See appendix 1 for the definition of the mobility indices.
Mλ[P]
Mt[P]
Md[P]
Mf[P]
Ml[P]
MB[P]
Mm[P]
Mˆβ
MH
MDC
B-2
Table 3. Opportunities of children in some published transition matrices
Children of Children of Children of Children of
bottom 25-50 50-75 top
Z (US) 1.000 1.160 1.322 1.360
R (US) 1.000 1.033 1.188 1.378
R (It) 1.000 1.000 1.053 1.156
D (GB) 1.000 1.020 1.086 1.441
B-3
Figure 1. The conflict between IAWR and IABT
z
y
type i
type j
z
y
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Figure 2.  Transition matrices and opportunity sets
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